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Reining-In a Rogue Policy:
the Imperative of Immigration Reform
It was Napoleon who said “policy is destiny.”   There are few better examples of the
direct link between the change-creating influences of public policies on subsequent societal
outcomes than immigration policy.  As with the early history of all nations of the Western
Hemisphere, mass immigration played a major role in the acquisition of the population and labor
force of the United States.  The era of significance ranged from the colonial period up to the
early years of the Twentieth Century. Beginning in 1914 and continuing for the ensuing 50
years, however, immigration steadily declined and immigration policy receded dramatically in
terms of its importance. Without warning or anticipation, the process reversed itself again as the
result of seemingly incidental policy changes initiated in 1965.  The phenomenon of mass
immigration was accidentally revived. Since then, immigration levels soared, and, once more,
immigration policy has become a major factor in shaping the nation’s labor force and population.
Unlike the earlier era of mass immigration, however, the U.S. economy in the mid-1960s
was no longer in its adolescent stage of development. Instead, it was a mature economy that
was itself in the throes of significant transformations of both its demand for labor and of its
supply of labor. The introduction and spread of automatic control technologies; the intensity and
scale of the military arms race of the Cold War era; and the opening of the economy to global
competition collectively translated into a demand for a more highly skilled and better educated
workforce. Likewise, on the supply side, the postwar baby boom generation was just beginning
to enter the labor force in record numbers while changing social attitudes and political policies
were seeking to broaden economic opportunities for minorities and women. The one thing the
new economy did not need was an infusion of more workers per se—especially if they were
disproportionately unskilled and poorly educated.
It was quickly apparent by the mid-1970s that the extant immigration policy of the nation
was completely out-of-step with the nation’s evolving economic and social trends. A drive to
reform immigration policy commenced. Despite findings by impartial national commissions and
by the academic research community over the ensuing decades, these reform proposals have
been regularly rebuffed. Immigration policy has been captured by a coalition of special interest
groups and organizations who have their own selfish private agendas. They have little concern
whether their goals are consistent with the national interest. As a result, immigration has
become a rogue political policy that has been allowed the luxury of functioning without
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accountability for its economic and demographic consequences. Reining-in immigration policy
remains a national imperative.
The Context of Policy Assessment
Given the prominent role that immigration played in the early history of the nation, it may
seem surprising that the subject is not mentioned anywhere in the U.S. Constitution. But as its
significance to the national well-being was gradually recognized, the federal government moved
in the late Nineteenth Century to claim its exclusive authority to regulate all aspects of
immigration.i Thus, immigration policy must be viewed for what it has become: a purely
discretionary action of the U.S. government. It has the sole duty to set annual admission levels;
to establish admission categories; to specify entry requirements; to order entry priorities; and to
enforce the restrictions it imposes. No citizen of a foreign country has a right to reside, to visit, to
enter, to work, or to seek refuge in the United States simply because they desire to do so. They
may only do so legally with the expressed permission of our national government.
Accompanying such exclusive power to regulate is an implied duty to design an immigration
policy that conforms to the best interests of the citizens of the United States.
It is true, of course, that a significant number of immigrants in the post-1965 era have
simply ignored the policy restrictions altogether and have illegally entered or overstayed their
visas. Thus, immigration reform also includes the necessity to enact the means to enforce the
policies that are put in place. The same special interest groups that have opposed reforms of
the legal immigration and refugee systems have usually opposed all efforts to strengthen
enforcement measures.
Because immigration involves the movement of people rather than of products, it is labor
market consequences that are ultimately at the heart of any effort to assess policy congruence
with the national interest.ii  Fundamentally, immigration is an economic issue although, as post-
1965 events testify, public policy has seldom been formed on this basis. Nonetheless,
immigrants must work to support themselves or they must be supported by others who do. The
key issues that emerge pertain to what impact immigrants have on the size, composition, and
distribution of the nation’s labor force, as well as the fiscal and social costs it imposes on society
for their support.
The Accidental Issue: Mass Immigration
The contemporary era of mass immigration can be dated to the passage of the
Immigration Act of 1965. That year, the foreign-born population totaled only 4.4 percent of the
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U.S. population. It was the lowest percentage since data have been collected—which goes back
to the pre-Civil War era. It is highly likely that it was the lowest percentage in the history of the
nation.
In the mid-1960s, the nation was prospering. Unemployment was declining. There was
no shortage of labor in 1965 that required an increase in immigration. Indeed, 1965 was exactly
the year that the post-war “baby boom” hit the labor market. One million more people turned 18
years old (the primary labor force entry age for full-time job seeking) that year¾and th t high
annual entry level of 18-year-olds persisted for the next 16 years. It was also during that year
(i.e., July 1, 1965) that the equal employment opportunity provisions (Title VII) of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 went into effect. The civil rights legislation was primarily concerned with improving
the economic status of black Americans. It is ironic, therefore, that no racial group has benefited
less over the ensuing years nor has been more adversely affected by what mass immigration
has produced.
Indeed, a strong case can be made that the passage of the Immigration Act of 1965 was
primarily a manifestation of the nation’s civil rights agenda of that same era. For the primary
motivation for passage of the legislation was to end the overt discrimination embodied in the
nation’s immigration law that had been in effect since 1924. The national origins admission
system which had been created by the Immigration Act of 1924 was blatantly discriminatory—
favoring Western and Northern European countries while disfavoring immigration from Eastern
and Southern Europe and, in conjunction with earlier legislation, it virtually prohibited
immigration from Asian countries. Western Hemisphere immigration, however, was not
numerically restricted, so there were obviously other issues involved in the passage of the
restrictive legislation in 1924 than merely ethnocentrism. They involved legitimate concerns over
the adverse economic effects of the mass immigration of the preceding decades on wages,
income, housing, education, and unemployment on the nation’s labor force and population.
Thus, the paramount goal of the Immigration Act of 1965 was to achieve a non-
discriminatory immigration policy. The reformers “were so incensed with the ethnocentrism of
the laws of the past that they spent virtually all of their energies seeking to eliminate the country
of origin provisions” and, as a consequence, “they gave very little attention to the substance or
long range implications of the policy that would replace them.”iii In a nutshell, this is the story of
what has subsequently transpired. The nation-changing ramifications of the Immigration Act of
1965—with its extended family-based admission system and new refugee admission category—
were not foreseen by any of its proponents. In testimony prior to its passage, Secretary of State
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Dean Rusk stated that “the significance of immigration for the United States now depends less
on numbers than on the quality of the immigrants.”iv Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass), the
floor manager of the bill in the Senate, stated “this bill is not concerned with increasing
immigration to this country, nor will it lower any of the high standards we apply in the selection
of immigrants.”v Kennedy also said “our cities will not be flooded with a million immigrants
annually,” that “the ethnic mix of this country will not be upset” and “it [the pending bill] would not
cause American workers to lose their jobs.”vi None of these assurances has proved to be valid.
Supposedly, these assurances were made at that time because they would not be desirable
policy outcomes.
The Effects of Post-1965 Immigration
POPULATION
The most obvious effect of the changes in immigration policy that began in 1965 has
been the significant increase in the size of the foreign-born population. Since 1965, the foreign-
born population has risen from 4.4 percent to 9.7 percent of the population in 1997 (or about 1
of every 10 people).vii In absolute terms, the foreign-born population has increased from 8.6
million people in 1965 to 25.8 million people in 1997. If an allowance is made for the undercount
of illegal immigrants in the official data, the actual inflow has certainly exceeded a million people
a year throughout most of the 1980s and all of the 1990s to date.
Of even greater significance for the future than the proportional and absolute size of the
foreign-born population has been its contributory influence on the growth rate of the nation’s
population. The 1990 Census revealed that the foreign-born accounted for 37 percent of the
population growth in the decade of the 1980s. Given what has already transpired and what can
be anticipated for the few years remaining in the 1990s, the foreign-born will account for an
even greater percentage in the present decade.
As for the future, studies of the projected influence of immigration on the size of the U.S.
population for the next century are staggering. Two relevant demographic studies have been
made—one by the U.S. Bureau of the Census and the other by the National Research Council
(NRC). Using both of their “intermediate projections” of the effects of immigration (i.e., an annual
entry of 820,000 immigrants through to the year 2050, which is the closest of their estimates to
the annual level that is actually occurring), they project that the 1995 population of 263 million
persons will increase to 387 million (NRC) or 394 million (Census Bureau) persons by 2050.viii
Of this aggregate growth of from 124 to 131 million people (depending which projection is used),
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they both agree that two-thirds of the total growth—or about 80 million people—will be the
consequence of immigrants themselves and of their children who will be born in this country. In
the summary words of the NRC study, “immigration, then, will obviously play the dominant role
in our future population growth of the United States.”ix
ETHNIC COMPOSITION
As was true during the earlier years when the national origins system was in existence,
the post-1965 contemporary mass immigration is also extremely unbalanced in terms of its
ethnic composition. As of 1997, 27 percent of the entire foreign-born population of the nation are
immigrants from only one country—Mexico. Over half of the entire foreign-born population of the
United States in 1997 have come from Latin America. Likewise, 27 percent of the foreign-born
population have come from Asian countries. Indeed, 92 percent of the total Asian foreign-born
population in 1997 have entered the United States since 1970. Europe and Africa, the two
continents that supplied virtually all of the immigrants the of earlier era of mass immigration,
account for only about 20 percent of the nation’s foreign-born population in 1997.
LABOR FORCE
As the immigrant population is younger than the native-born population and it contains
more men than women, the impact of immigration on the labor force is significantly greater than
is revealed by the aforementioned population statistics. In 1997, foreign-born workers
accounted for 11.5 percent of the labor force (or almost one of every eight U.S. workers). Even
this high percentage must be viewed as a minimal figure because of the undercount of illegal
immigrant workers.
As in the past, a key feature of the post-1965 mass immigration has been its geographic
concentration. In 1997, five states (California, New York, Florida, Texas, and Illinois) accounted
for 65 percent of the entire foreign-born population and 66 percent of the entire foreign-born
labor force. The foreign-born are also overwhelmingly concentrated in only a handful of urban
areas—especially in their central cities. These particular labor markets, however, are among the
nation’s largest in size: Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, Miami, and Chicago.
Collectively, these five cities accounted for 51 percent of all foreign-born workers.
The most significant labor market characteristics of the current foreign-born labor work
force, however, is the fact that they are disproportionately characterized by workers with little
human capital. The 1990 Census revealed that the 25 percent of foreign-born adults who were
25 years and older had less than a ninth-grade education (compared with only 10 percent of
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native-born adults). Moreover, 42 percent of the foreign-born adult population did not have the
equivalent of a high school diploma (compared to 23 percent of the native-born adult
population). Thus, it is the low-skilled, low wage sector of the nation’s major urban labor markets
that are the most impacted by immigrant job-seekers.x Not only do low-skilled immigrants
compete with each other for whatever opportunities exist at the bottom of the nation’s job
hierarchy, but they also compete with the low-skilled native-born workers who are
disproportionately from minority groups in the nation’s largest urban labor markets.
The effects of the inordinately low human capital attributes of many immigrants is seen
in their occupational patterns and unemployment experiences. In 1997, 25 percent of the
foreign-born population are employed in the low-skilled occupations of laborers, farm workers,
and operatives while an additional 20 percent were employed in low-skilled personal service
occupations. The unemployment rate of foreign-born workers in 1997 was 7.4 percent, whereas
the national unemployment rate was 4.9 percent. The unemployment rate for foreign-born
workers with less than a high school education was 9.8 percent, and it was 14.5 percent for
similarly situated native-born workers. Consequently, immigration’s greatest impact on the labor
market is in the least skilled segment of the labor force that is already having the greatest
difficulty finding employment. There is no shortage of unskilled native-born workers, as indicated
by their inordinately high unemployment rates as well as by the high number of adult illiterates in
the nation’s population (estimated to exceed 30 million persons).
POVERTY
As a consequence of the extensive differences in the human capital characteristics of
the native-born and the foreign-born population, there is a significant variation in the incidence
of poverty between the two groups. In 1997, 13.6 percent of the nation’s total population were
classified as living in poverty. For the foreign-born population, however, 20.9 percent were living
under poverty conditions compared to 12.9 percent of the native-born population. Thus, it is not
surprising that immigrant families rely more heavily on the use of both cash and non-cash
welfare programs than do native-born families.xi
The inordinately high incidence of poverty among immigrant families has dire
intergenerational consequences on the preparation of their children to become future workers.
It is estimated that two million immigrant youth enrolled in U.S. public schools in the decade of
the 1980s and even more will do so in the 1990s.  Studies of these immigrant children indicate
that they are “twice as likely to be poor as compared to all students, thereby straining local
school resources.”xii  Moreover, “many immigrants, including those of high school age, have had
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little or no schooling and are illiterate even in their native languages.”xiii New demands for the
creation of bilingual programs and special education classes have significantly added to the
costs of urban education and have frequently led to the diversion of funds from important
remedial programs for other needy children.xiv Overcrowding of urban school systems, already
confronting enormous educational burdens, has frequently occurred with devastating impacts on
the educational process.xv Other educational costs to social policy are more subtle but equally
as significant as the financial concerns.  Namely, the societal goal of desegregated urban
schools has been greatly retarded by the arrival of immigrant children because it has increased
the racial isolation of inner-city black children.xvi
INCOME INEQUALITY
The U.S. Census Bureau has studied the distribution of income since 1947. It has
reported that from 1947 to 1968 there was a perceptible decline in family income inequality in
the United States (a decline of 7.4 percent). This was the era b forethe current era of mass
immigration commenced. But since 1968, income inequality among families has increased. By
1982, income inequality was back to the same level as it was in 1947 and, by 1994, family
income inequality in the nation had increased  by 22.4 percent over the distribution that
existed in 1968.xvii It is worthy of note that 1968 was the first year that the policy changes
contained in the Immigration Act of 1965 went into full effect.
In 1994, the President’s Council of Economic Advisers formally acknowledged in its
annual report that “immigration has increased the relative supply of less-educated labor and
appears to have contributed to the increasing inequality of income.”xviii Although their report
claims that the aggregate effect is “small” on the national distribution of income, immigration is a
major factor in the deterioration of wages and incomes for low wage and low income families.
Such is especially the case in those urban centers where immigrants have congregated. Indeed,
a 1995 study by the Bureau of Labor Statistics found that “immigration accounted of
approximately 20 to 25 percent of the increase in the wage gap between low and high-skilled
workers during the 1980s in the 50 largest metropolitan areas of the United States.”xix
Furthermore, the earlier-mentioned NRC study of the impact of immigration revealed that almost
half of the decline in real wages for native-born high school dropouts from 1980-1994 can be
attributed to the adverse competitive impact of unskilled foreign workers.xx Henc , just because
the effects of immigration are dissipated when the perspective is at the national level does not
mean that they are insignificant in those local labor markets where mass immigration is a reality.
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LABOR MOBILITY
Post-1965 mass immigration has disrupted the internal migration patterns of native-born
workers. Research on labor mobility has disclosed that the higher the concentration of
immigrants in a local labor market, the less attractive is the locality to native-born workers.xxi It
has also revealed that foreign-born workers are less likely to move out of states where they are
concentrated than are native-born workers.xxii Furthermore, unskilled native-born workers, who
are losing-out in the competition for jobs with low-skilled immigrants, are more likely to leave
their former communities to find jobs elsewhere.xxiii
The Saga of Reform
The re-emergence of mass immigration began as a gradual process in the late 1960s.
But by the late 1970s, its unintended effects and mass abuse by illegal immigrants had become
sufficiently worrisome to warrant the creation by Congress of a special commission to study
what had unexpectedly happened and to recommend policy changes. Known as the Select
Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy (SCIRP), it was composed of 16 members and
chaired by a non-politician, the Rev. Theodore Hesburgh (who was President of Notre Dame
University at the time). When SCIRP tendered its final report in March 1981, it concluded that
immigration was “out of control” and comprehensive reforms were essential.xxiv Noting that
immigration policy had been captured by special interest groups, SCIRP rejected their myopic
appeals to satisfy their private agendas at the cost of the national interest. Specifically, it stated:
“The Commission has rejected the arguments of many economists, ethnic groups, and religious
leaders for a great expansion in the number of immigrants and refugees.”xxv Inst ad it called for
a “cautious approach” in reforming the immigration system and concluded that “this is not the
time for a large-scale expansion in legal immigration.”xxvi
Congress did not respond to SCIRP’s recommendations for changes in the legal
immigration system but it did, ultimately, pass the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
(IRCA) to address the issue of illegal immigration. IRCA included a generous amnesty program
that permitted 2.7 million illegal immigrants to adjust their status to become permanent resident
aliens and it established a system of workplace sanctions to prevent employers from hiring
illegal immigrants. The hope was to deter new illegal entries in the future. Unfortunately, the
sanctions system was full of loopholes and all of IRCA’s deterrence measures were poorly
funded. Hence, illegal immigration has continued to flourish despite IRCA’s worthwhile
legislative intentions.
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In 1990, Congress—in direct contradiction of SCIRP’s earlier recommendation—
dramatically increased the scale of legal immigration. The Immigration Act of 1990 raised
annual admissions by 35 percent over the level in place since 1965. It also significantly eased
the access of U.S. employers to foreign workers who can be hired and allowed to work in the
country “temporarily” as non-immigrant workers.
To monitor the impact of the 1990 legislation, Congress created the U.S. Commission on
Immigration Reform (CIR). It was a nine-member commission, chaired from 1993 until her death
in January 1996 by Barbara Jordan, (formerly a Congresswoman, she was a professor of public
policy at the University of Texas). CIR’s final report was released on September 30, 1997 but it
was preceded by the release of a series of interim reports.xxvii CIR identified illegal immigration
as the “most immediate need” for policy attention. Among its recommendations was a call for a
significant expansion in the size of the U.S. Border Patrol, the construction of new physical
barriers where practical; a verification system to validate the authenticity of social security cards
used to establish eligibility for employment; and steps to reduce access to “breeder documents”
(e.g., birth certificates) used to obtain other documents (e.g., social security cards and driver’s
licenses) used unlawfully by illegal immigrants to gain employment.
With regard to legal immigration, CIR recommended a reduction back to the pre-1990
admission levels; the elimination of the extended family preferences for admission; the
elimination of the category that permits unskilled workers to be admitted; the elimination of the
“diversity immigrant” admission category; and the inclusion of refugees within the total number
of immigrants that are to be admitted each year. (Since 1980 refugees and asylum applicants
have been admitted outside of the ceilings imposed by the nation’s immigration law.)
During the course of its deliberations, CIR requested in 1995 that the National Research
Council (NRC) of the National Academy of Sciences convene a panel of experts to assess
independently the economic and demographic consequences of  immigration. Agreeing to do
so, the NRC released its report in 1997. With regard to its demographic findings, as noted
earlier, its “intermediate projection” indicated that immigration would account for two-thirds of
the population growth that will occur in the United States by the year 2050. As for their
economic findings, the NRC report catalogued the fact that the educational attainment levels of
post-1965 immigrants have steadily declined. Consequently, foreign-born workers earn on
average less than native-born workers and that the earnings gap between them has widened
over the years. Those from Latin America, which presently accounts for over half of the entire
foreign-born population of the nation, earn the lowest wages. The NRC, however, found no
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evidence of discriminatory wages being paid to immigrants.xxviii Rather, it found that immigrant
workers are paid less than native-born workers because, in fact, they are less skilled and more
poorly educated. The relative decline in both skills and wages of the foreign-born population
were attributed to the fact that most immigrants are coming from the poorer nations of the world,
where average education, wages, and skill levels are far below those in the United States. As a
direct consequence, post-1965 immigrants are disproportionately increasing the segment of the
nation’s labor supply that has the lowest human capital endowments. In the process, they are
lowering the wages of all workers in the lowest skill sector of the labor market. The chief
beneficiaries of immigration are the immigrant workers themselves whose wages are usually
considerably higher than if they had stayed in their homelands.
The NRC did find that there was a net “benefit” of immigration to the nation’s labor
market each year of between $1 to $10 billion. This measure, however, is only a “benefit” that
only an economist could appreciate. Namely, the “benefits” to the economy are largely the result
of the suppression of the wages of workers who compete with the immigrant inflow that causes
lower prices of goods and services for the economy. These suppressed wages are mostly those
of low-skilled workers with low incomes, but they are also the wages of workers at the other end
of the skills spectrum—those in some professional and technical occupations that have also had
a disproportionate increase in immigrant and non-immigrant “temporary” workers. It is unlikely
that any of these workers consider this artificial manipulation by the government of the size of
their labor supply to be a “benefit.”
Likewise, where there are economic benefits there are always economic costs. In this
case, the NRC calculated the net fiscal costs of public services to immigrants (e.g., those
associated with increased education, medical, welfare, incarceration, and public housing) to
range from $14.8 to $20.2 billion a year. Obviously, these fiscal costs are disproportionately
distributed among the communities and states depending on the size of the foreign-born
population in their respective jurisdictions. In California, for example, it costs every native-born
household $1,178 a year in added taxes to cover the costs of government services provided to
immigrants in the state in excess of the taxes the immigrants pay.
Meanwhile, in response to CIR’s interim reports and in anticipation of what its final report
would say in 1997,  Congress made a pre-emptive move in 1996. It once more took up
immigration reform. But with a host of special interest groups fighting every proposed change,
opponents of reform were able to kill all proposals pertaining to legal immigration and refugee
limitations. The watered-down legislation that passed in 1996 did increase funding for
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deterrence measures against illegal immigration, but it failed to include the most important
means needed to curb the abuse—the creation of a viable verification system of work eligibility
to be employed in the United States.
Subsequently, when the NRC published its thorough research findings in May 1997, and
when CIR, after six years of intense work, issued its comprehensive final report in September
1997, they were both met by a non-response of interest by the media and the policymakers. By
this time, the pro-immigration lobby had won the day and the pursuit of the national interest had
once again been thwarted.
Concluding Comments
In assessing the latest political debacle of the immigration reform movement in the mid-
1990s, political scientists James Gimpel and James Edwards wrote in 1998: “The voice of the
people has had little impact on the tone or direction of the immigration debate in Washington.”xxix
They point out that despite the extensive research findings that show the need for significant
legislative changes and that public opinion polls consistently show that the citizenry want these
changes to take place, it makes no difference to the professional politicians. Immigration policy
has been captured by an unholy alliance that links some religious organizations, ethnic groups,
libertarian economists, and the powerful immigration lawyer’s association (i.e., the American
Immigration Lawyers Association)—all who have self-interests and financial interests in
maintaining the status quo)—with corporate America (ranging from agri-business, to the
garment industry, to the health care industry to the computer industry) that has a vested
interests in cheap labor policies.
But immigration reform is not going to go away. The issue continues to fester. For as
George Borjas and Richard Freeman, the key authors of the labor market portion of the NRC
report, have subsequently written in response to the gross distortions of their work by the pro-
immigration lobby and the media:
Immigration creates winners and losers. Low income workers and
taxpayers in immigrant states lose; those who employ immigrants
or use immigrant services win, as do the immigrants themselves.
The critical issue is how much do we care about the well being of
immigrants compared with the Americans who win and the
Americans who lose?xxx
For the time being, it would seem that policymakers are not concerned with the wage
and income inequities or the labor market distortions that are the product of the nation’s extant
immigration policies. They are totally oblivious to its long term demographic implications. But, as
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the NRC report made abundantly clear, immigration is not a free lunch. Eventually as the costs
of immigration continue to mount and as the change-creating power of immigration policy
continues to re-shape the nation’s destiny, this rogue element of public policy will be reined-in.
The sooner that day comes, the better off the nation will be.
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